Black and gray hole attack is one kind of routing disturbing attacks and can bring great damage to the network. As a result, an efficient algorithm to detect black and gray attack is itnportant. This paper de1nonstrate an adaptive approach to detecting black and gray hole attacks in ad hoc network based on a cross layer design. In network layer, we proposed a path-based 1nethod to overhear the next hop's action. This scheme does not send out extra control packets and saves the syste1n resources of the detecting node. In MAC layer, a collision rate reporting system is established to estimate dynamic detecting threshold so as to lov. 1 er the false positive rate under high network overload. We choose DSR protocol to test our algorithm and ns-2 as our simulation tool. Our experiment result verifies our theo1y: the average detection rate is above 90% and the fa lse positive rate is be low I 0%. Moreover, the adaptive threshold strategy contributes to decrease the false positive rate.
Introduction
M obile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) [l] is one kind of new w ireless network structures. Unlike traditional Wireless LAN solutions, all nodes are movable and the topology of the network is changing dynamically in an Ad Hoc Networks, "vhich bring great challenges to the security of Ad Hoc Network. As a result, attackers can take advantage of flaws in routing protocols to carry out various attacks [2] [3] . Black hole attack and gray hole attacks [4) are two class ical attacks under Ad Hoc networks, which could disturb routing protocol and bring about huge damage to the net\vork' s topology.
In this paper, we propose an innovative approach to detecting black hole and gray hole attacks by mod ify ing the detecting thresho ld according to the network's overload. We manipulate a cross layer method to improve the performance of our detection. While the n1echanism presented in this paper applies to any Ad Hoc protocol, \Ve wi ll focus our attention, without loss of generality, on DSR protocol (5) in network layer and IEEE 802.11 protocol in MAC layer.
The re1nainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the related researches. In Section III, a path based detecting algorith1n over DSR protocol is proposed. We discussed its advantage and disadvantage. In Section IV, we present at1 enhanced method and explain the a lgorithm to estimate the detecting threshold. In Section V, some si1nulation results are given to characterize the perfor1nance of our proposed method. Finally, we draw our conclusions.
Related Work

Black and Gray Hole Attacks
Black hole attack disturbs the routing protocol by deceiving other nodes about the routing information. A black hole node works in the followi ng scheme: once receiving RREQ and RREP 1nessages, the attacker replies RREP 1nessages directly and clai1ns that it is the destinat ion node. The source node is likely to receive a pseudo-RREP fro m the attacker before the real RREP returns. Under these circumstances, the source node sends data packets to the black hole instead of the destination node. When the source node trans1nits data packets through the black hole, the attacker discards them without sending back a RERR message. As for gray hole, its behavior is si1nilar to a black hole. A gray hole does not drop all data packets but j ust pa11 of packets. We define the Gray Magnitude as the percentage of the packets which are maliciously dropped by an attacker. For example, a gray hole is gray 1nagnitude of 60% w ill drop a data packet w ith a probabi lity of 60% and a classical black hole has a gray magnitude of I 00% .
The black and gray hole attack will bring great han11 to the performance of Ad Hoc network. In previous research, the authors have carried out experi1nent on black hole attacks [6] . In Section V of this paper, \Ve first analyze the impact of gray hole under different 1 nalicious drop rate. The malicious drop rate is defined by the ratio of dropped packet number and received packet number. Especially, the malicious drop rate of a black hole is 100%.
Detection Methods
Sun et al [7] presented a genera] approach for detecting the black hole attack. They devised a neighborhood-based method to detect the intruder and a routing recovery protocol to set up a correct path to the true destination. They first introduced the neighbor set of a node, which is all of the nodes that are withj n the rad io trans1nission range of a node. Two types of control packets are introduced to share neighbor set between different nodes. If two neighbor sets received at the sa1ne time are different enough, it can be concluded that they are generated by two different nodes. One disadvantage of this scheme is that there rnust be a public key infrastructure or the detection is still vulnerable.
Patcha et al (8] proposed a collaborative method for black hole attack prevention. A watchdog 1nethod is introduced to incorporate a collaborative architecture to tackle collusion a1nongst nodes. In this algorithm, nodes in the netvvork are classified into trusted, watchdog, and ord inary nodes. Every watchdog that is elected should observe its normal node neighbors to decide whether they can be treated as trusted or malicious.
Gao et al [9] proposed to use aggregate signature algorithm [IO] to trace packet dropping nodes. The proposal \.vas consisted of three related algorithms: 1) the creating proof algorith1n.
2) The checkup algorithtn.
3) The diagnosis algorith1n. The strengths of this proposal are: l) the rel iability is satisfying, as evidence on forwarded packets is used; 2) the application scope is broad, as bi-directional con11nunication links are not necessary; 3) the security is satisfying, as it is hard for malicious nodes to escape detection; 4) the bandwidth overhead is low, as nodes do not need to monitor each other.
Shila et al [l l] presented a solution to defend selective forward ing attack (gray hole attack) in Wireless Mesh Networks [ 12] . The first phase of the algorithm is Counter-Threshold Based and uses the detection threshold and packet counter to identify the attacks. The second phase is Query-Based and uses acknowledgtnent fro1 n the intern1ediate nodes to localize the attacker. In the first phase, two types of packets, Control packet and Control ACK packet, are used to detect the attacker. Furthermore, they determine the appropriate value of detection threshold based on the routing metric ETX [ 13] to improve the perfonnance under different network situation.
A Path-based Detecting Method
Detection Algorithm
Our proposal is based on a path based scheme. That is, a node does not watch every node in the neighbor, but only observes the next hop in cun·ent route path. For example, in Fig. 1 , S is the source node; D is the destination node; and A is a black hole. Node S is sending data packets to node D through the path S, A, B, D. In our scheme, Node Sonly watches Node A, which is the next hop; but does not care Node 1 and Node 2. To implement the algorith_ m, every node should keep a FwdPktBuffer, which is a packet signature buffer. The algorithm is divided into three steps:
1) When a packet is forwarded out, its signature is added into the FwdPktBuffer and the detecting node overhears. 2) Once the action that the next hop forwards the packet is overheard, the signature wi ll be released fro1n the FwdPktBuffer. 3) In a fixed period of ti1ne, the detecting node should calculate the overhear rate of its next hop and compare it "vith a threshold. We define overhear rate in the Nth period of time as OR(N) .
OR(N ) =total overheard packer number totalforwared p acker number
If the forwarding rate is lower than the threshold, the detecting node w ill consider the next hop as a black or gray hole. Latter, the detecting node would avoid forwarding packets through this suspect node.
Advantage of the Algorithm
Our 1nethod has several advantages:
• ln this scheme, each node only depends on itself to detect a black or gray hole. The algorithm does not send out extra control packets so that Routing Packet Overhead (the ratio of total number of routing related trans1nissions and the total nu1nber of packet transmissions) remains the sa1ne as the standard DSR routing protocol.
• Not like other collaborative detecting architectures, our proposal requires no encryption on the control packets to avoid further attacks on detection information sharing.
• There is no need to watch all neighbors' behavior. Only the next hop in the route path should be observed . As a result, the syste1n perfonnance waste on detection a lgorithm is lowered.
Analysis of False Positive Probability
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One problem of this detection 1nethod is that it suffers fro1n a high false positive probability under high network overload if a constant threshold is used . T he cause of high fa lse positive probability is hidden node prob le1n in can·ier-sensing multiple-access w ith collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol. A hidden node is a node vvhich is beyond range of a packet sender (node S in Fig. 2 ) but in the range of a packet receiver (Node A in fig 2) . In fig 2, Node B does not hear the data from Node S to Node A, and it is a hidden node. When Node B transmits to node C, the transmission collides with that from Node A to node B. Therefore, the hidden nodes lead to higher collision probability. As for path based detection, black node problem will greatly increase the false positive probability. In fig 2, Node S is source node and Node C is destination node. Packet I is transrnitted from Node B to Node C. At the same time, Packet 2 is transmitted from Node S to Node A. Consequently, Packet 1 and Packet 2 will collide at Node A. Then Node S will retrans1nit Packet 2; but Packet 1 will not be sent again because Packet 1 has been received by Node C successfully. As a result, Node A tnisses Packet l and treats it being dropped by Node B deliberately. In sum1nary, a high network overload leads to a high collision rate caused by h idden node problem, so that the probability that a detecting node fails to overhear its next hop increases accordingly. Thus, the false positive probability rises in the end. 
MAC Layer Collision Report Mechanism
To avoid the proble1 n caused by h idden node proble1n , we designed a cross-layer mechanism. Two counters, collisionPktNum an d nonColPktN um, are added to standard 802.11 protocol. If a collision occurs, collisionPktNu1n increases 1; if a packet being received successfully, nonColPktNum increase 1. In a fixed period of time, the collision is defined as follow ing:
collisionP ktNum + nonColPktNum
The collision rate is reported to network Layer, and meanwhile, two counters are reset to zero.
In network layer (DSR protocol in this paper), accumulated collision rate is calculated. Let ACR(N) be the accu.mulated collision rate in the Nth time period and RCR(N) be the reported collision rate in the Nth time period. We fine ACR(N) as: 0,
Equivalently, when N > 1:
Threshold Calculation
Let ~'Ollision be the actual coll ision probability in the Nth time period; and P forword be the actual forvvard probability of a node; and P overhear be the probability of a node overhearing the next hop's forward action. So,
Our mechan ism is able to measure ~verhear using overhear rate, OR(N) , and ~~>llision using accu1nulated collision rate ACR(N). Substitute them into (5).
.f (6) Let T 1 be the fixed detection threshold. If a node drops packets in a probability higher than Tl, the detecting node can accuse it as a gray hole. Equivalently,
OR(N) <(I-Tr ) ·(l -ACR(N))
Simulation Environment
Our proposal is in1ple1nented in ns2 [14] and the perfonnance is evaluated in terms of network throughput, false positive probability and false negative probability. We use two simulations to evaluate our proposal.
A Grid Simulation Environment:
The first one is network with 1200m* 1200m space and 25 fixed nodes as Fig. 3 . Every node is settled in a fixed location. We set the maximum trans1nission range as 250m and the distance between two neighbors is 200m so that a node can only have 4 neighbors. The si1 nulation span is 300 seconds. We implement this scenario to evaluate the collision rate of each node in different location under different CBR rate. The comm unication patterns we use are 8 constant bit rate (CBR) com1ections with a size of 512 byte, but the interval between two packets (CBR rate) remain variable. 
A Random Simulation Environment:
We simulate a network with 670m*670m space and 50 mobile nodes. The si1n u lation span is I 00 seconds . The mobile nodes move within the net\vork space according to the rando1n waypoint 1nobility model [15] w ith a 1na"-imum speed of 20m/s. The pause ti1 ne is 50 seconds. The comn1un ication patterns vve use are 10 constant bit rate (CBR) connections with a size of 512 byte. l n the following simulation, the ti1ne period for coll is ion report is one second. confidently use the for1nula in Section IV, we must evaluate whether accumulated collision rate actually refl ects a node 's network overload. 3) Detection Probability: the ratio of the number of detected 1nalicious nodes and the total number of malicious nodes. This metric directly reflects the performance of our detection algorithm. 4) False Positive Probability: the ratio of number of honest nodes mistaken ly detected as n1alic ious and the total number of honest nodes. T heoretically, our adaptive detection method should have a better perfonnance on false positive probability than the fixed-threshold solution. We verify this inference by con1paring false positive probability between different solutions.
Metrics
Simulation Results and Discussion
Gray Hole Attack's Impact on Network Performance
The first task is to deter1n ine the i1npact of gray hole attack. We focus on the number of attackers and the gray magnitude of gray bole. In this experiment, we use the random sin1ulation env ironment We rando1n ly choose 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, and 15 1nalicious nodes in each of the si1n ulation test. Furthermore, different gray 1 nagnitude (GM) -0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0-are tested. Here, packet delivery rate is used to reflect the performance o f network. We repeat every single experi1nent for I 0 times and then calculate the average value and the standard error.
The simulation result is presented in Fig. 4 . In case the network is free from gray hole attack, packet delivery rate is c lose to 1.0, w hich is the best status of the test network. When the number of gray hole increases, packet delivery rate decreases accord ingly. Especially, if there are 15 black holes (gray ho les with gray magnitude of 1.0), more than 40% packets wi ll be lost in the half way. On the other hand, a higher gray 1nagn itude leads to a n1ore server impact. While over 40% packets lost under the situation of 15 black holes, less than 20% packets are dropped maliciously when the gray magnitude is lower than 0.6.
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Based on this result, we wi ll only focus on gray hole vvith gray magnitude of 0.6 or above, because a lower gray rnagnitude cannot bring about great damage to the network . 
Analysis of Collision Rate
It is reasonable to estimate that the collision rate should be high in two cases: 1) vvhere number of CBR stream is large, 2) where CBR rate is high. To verify this hypothesis, vve designed an experiment under the grid siinulation environn1ent. a. The node number is based on Fig. 3 We set up 8 CBR streams: from Node 1 to Node 25, fro1n Node 2 to Node 24, from Node 3 to Node 23, from Node 4 to Node 22, fro1n Node 5 to Node 21, fro1n Node 10 to Node 16, from Node 15 to Node 11, and from Node 20 to Node 6. These 8 CBR streams are sy1nmetrical to the center node (Node 13), so that a node which is closer to the center has a higher probability to be engaged into more CBR streams. We classified all 25 nodes into 6 class listed in Table I . In each class, every node is located to the center in the same distance. For example, the distance between nodes in Class II and the center is 200m; in Class VI is approxirnately 566m. Espec ially Node Class I only contains the center node . We cornpare the reported collision rate between different node classes to evaluate the number of CBR streatn's effect on collision probability.
Jn add it ion to location, we also consider the impact brought by d ifferent CBR rate. We carry out the experi1nent under different CBR rate and compare the reported collision as well . 5 shows the experiment result. The average coll ision rate is used to represent a node class's performance, and standard error is also given. 6 lines indicate collision rate of different node class. The center node suffers a high collision rate and collision happens less likely in those remote node classes. On the other hand, when CBR Stream Rate increases from 0.4KB/s to 5.0KB/s, repot1ed coll ision rate has an obvious trend to rise. For those nodes that are close to the center, collision rate rises more rapidly.
These results confir1n our previous inference that there are more collisions in the aera where network is crowded. Based on this result, we are confident to carry out furt her experi1nents.
The Performance of Our Detection Method
In the third experi1nent, our detection algorithm is tested. We use the random si1n ulation environrnent in this part. Because attackers with a gray magn itude below 60% only have slight i1npact on network's performance, in this experi1nent, only those attackers with gray magnitude above 60o/o are added into the network. We random ly choose 0, 3, 5, 8, 10, 13, and 15 inalicious nodes in each of the simulation test. We choose attackers' gray magn itude 100%. To get more accurate results, every single experi1nent is repeated for 10 times; average value and standard error of the experiment results are calculated and presented. Our detection threshold is dynarnically calculated by Formula (8) in Section IV, and the parameter T _f is set to 0.6. Fu1thermore, we compare our solution with the DSR_Probe [ 16] . Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 present the experiment result. In Fig. 6 , detection rate is co1npared. Our proposal accomplishes higher detection rate compared with DSR_Probe scheme. In DSR_Probe scheme, detection rate drops rapidly while gray hole nu1nber continues to increase; however, over method provided detection rate not less tha11 0.9 under call circumstance. Fig. 7 shows that our proposal gains relatively lower false positive rate. False Positive Rate vs. Gray Hole Number: Detection threshold is set to 0.6, and the attacker is black hole Actually, T_f being set to 0.6 is a conservative strategy. If T_f is 1 nodified to a higher value, false positive rate would decrease. However, we recommend 0.6 because ui1der this setting, the algorithm can safely detect nearly all kinds of gray hole which gray magnitude is larger than 0.6. The following is a validation test. We randon1ly choose 0 to 15 malicious nodes and 60% to 100% gray 1nagnitude for every attacker in each of the simulation test. We still run every single test for I 0 times. Test results are showed in Fig. 8 .
Approximately, detection rate still keeps above 90%, and false positive rate is lower than 5o/o. This result reflects that our detection scheme is valid for attackers with gray magnitude between 60% and l 00%.
Analysis of Dynamic Threshold
Last but not least, the dynamic threshold 's contribution on detection perfor1nance must be evaluated, so we designed the following experiment.
Detection rate and false positive rate are compared between fixed threshold strategy and dynamic strategy. The gray hole number is set to 10 and the gray 1nagnitude is set to 60%. CBR stream rate keeps changing from 0.5KB/s to 2.5KB/s. As same as previous tests, we run every single test for l 0 times.
It is presented in Fig. 9 that adaptive threshold method really decreases the false positive rate. Especially, when CBR stream rate reaches a high level, false positive rate rises sharply. However, in adaptive scheme, false positive rate remains in a relative low level. As for detection rate, the adaptive threshold sulotion is not as co1npetetive as the static threshold sulotion under a high CBR strea1n rate as shown in Fig. 10 . This result is predictable because a high CBR stream rate leads to a high coll ision rate. According to Formula (8) in Section IV, when collision rate rises, Td (N) increases as well, so that some gray hole will not be detected. This is an unsolved problem in the adaptive threshold strategy. 
Conclusion
Wireless Ad Hoc network is likely to be attacked by the black and gray hole attack. To solve this problem, we presented a path based method to detect black and gray hole attack. After theoretically analyzing advantages and disadvantages of this n1ethod, vve proposed an adaptive algorithm to enhance the detection performance. The simulation results reveal that attacks with gray magnitude above 60o/o would bring about magnifi cent damage to the network. We cotn pare our method to other strategy, and confirm our proposa l as successful to provide better detection. F inally, we evaluate the positive and negative impacts brought by adaptive detection scheme, which provide a better false positive rate, but a less competitive detection rate as wel l.
